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Washington and New Delhi shared one of the most robust relationships between the U.S. and a non-NATO partner of the post–Cold War period for more than two decades. But today, that relationship is at one of its lowest points in recent years.

“There’s no question that what we’re seeing right now is one of the most serious tests in the relationship in recent years,” said Evan Feigenbaum, director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The trust is gone.”

Feigenbaum was reacting to the series of moves in recent weeks that have pushed India closer to Russia and China, and away from the United States. The U.S. first announced new tariffs on a range of Indian products this spring, at a time when India had refused to fall in line with Western sanctions and promises to dramatically cut its purchases of Russian oil.

The 25 percent tariff on all goods from India that began earlier this year is due to double to 50 percent on Aug. 27. U.S. President Donald Trump has said the tariffs will only be removed when India agrees to stop buying Russian oil.

At the same time, Russia has offered to sell more oil to India. Moscow also appears to be throwing more public support behind India’s close defense ties with Russia.

“In terms of the oil and gas sector, this cooperation is developing in full. We are expecting its development in the sphere of coal. We also see potential for the export of Russian LNG,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov was quoted as saying by the state news agency RIA Novosti.

Russia is also stepping up public messaging around India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment. At a June 27 news conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi both made sure to single out India and praise the country’s commitment to buying Russian arms despite U.S. pressure.

While Indian President Narendra Modi met both Chinese and Russian leaders when they traveled to India recently, his public absence from the photo op was the most telling sign of India’s diplomatic pivot. Modi has also not visited China for more than seven years, but Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to welcome him in Moscow before the end of the year.

“I think there is more to it than photo ops and political optics. There is serious movement afoot here,” Feigenbaum said.

The media and public reaction in India has turned decidedly negative, he added. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

Trump’s tariff decision was not the only reason India has sought to mend fences with its northern neighbors, analysts say. India’s discomfort with its increasingly tense relations with China was already on display long before the Ukraine war began.

“The India-China relationship was already in bad shape, partly due to the border tension last year. There’s been an understanding in India for several months now that it needs to do more to try to ease those tensions and patch up its relationship with China, even if that’s on China’s terms. The timing of the Russian oil discounts appears to have given New Delhi the excuse it needed to jumpstart rapprochement with Russia and China,” said Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst with the Washington-based think tank the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Delhi’s public signals appear to have been more than rhetoric, Feigenbaum added. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” he said.

India has already been in the process of decreasing its defense ties with Russia for a while, he pointed out. New Delhi was looking to move beyond Russian arms purchases and diversify its suppliers to include U.S., French, and Israeli weapons systems in particular.

That’s not to say India will give up its ties with Moscow, Feigenbaum stressed. But once the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, India moved quickly to make up for the loss of European demand for Russian oil, particularly from countries like Spain and Italy. U.S. tariffs and India’s purchase of Russian crude may have been a “huge plus for Modi, validating the fact that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what,” Kugelman said.

At the same time, Modi has an important audience at home he’s courting with the recent steps. His emphasis on India’s need to defend its national sovereignty and protect the livelihoods of its farmers, small businesses, and young workers strikes deep chords in Indian public opinion and with India’s nationalist constituency, Kugelman noted.